Why Is Liberal Peace-building So Difficult? Some Lessons from Central America by Kurtenbach, Sabine
www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers
GIGA Research Unit: 
Institute of Latin American Studies
___________________________
Why Is Liberal Peace-building So Difficult?  
Some Lessons from Central America
Sabine Kurtenbach
N° 59 September 2007
GIGA WP 59/2007 
GIGA Working Papers 
 
Edited by GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies / Leibniz-Institut für Globale 
und Regionale Studien. 
The Working Paper Series serves to disseminate the research results of work in progress 
prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. An objective 
of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully 
polished. Inclusion of a paper in the Working Paper Series does not constitute publication 
and should not limit publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors. 
When Working Papers are eventually accepted by or published in a journal or book, the 
correct citation reference and, if possible, the corresponding link will then be included in 
the Working Papers website at: 
www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers. 
 
GIGA research unit responsible for this issue: Institute of Latin American Studies 
 
Editor of the GIGA Working Paper Series: Anja Zorob <zorob@giga-hamburg.de> 
Copyright for this issue: © Sabine Kurtenbach 
 
Editorial assistant and production: Vera Rathje 
 
 
 
All GIGA Working Papers are available online and free of charge at the website: 
www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers. Working Papers can also be ordered in print. For 
production and mailing a cover fee of € 5 is charged. For orders or any requests please 
contact: 
E-mail: workingpapers@giga-hamburg.de 
Phone: ++49 (0)40 - 428 25 548 
 
 
 
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies /  
Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien 
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21 
20354 Hamburg 
Germany 
E-mail: info@giga-hamburg.de 
Website: www.giga-hamburg.de 
GIGA WP 59/2007 
Why Is Liberal Peace-building So Difficult?  
Some Lessons from Central America 
 
 
Abstract 
The termination of war is mostly seen as a basis not just for recovery but for a fundamen-
tal transformation or change in development paths towards peace, stability and develop-
ment. The Central American peace processes of the last decades were one of the first labo-
ratories for the liberal peace-building paradigm which assumes that the threefold trans-
formation to peace, democracy and market economy is a self-strengthening process lead-
ing to sustainable development. Although none of the three countries slipped back into 
war, serious deficits remain. This paper introduces an analytical framework that aims at 
interrelating the threefold transformation with the impact generated by four processes. 
These include the repercussions generated by the international system on a country’s soci-
ety, its historical, cultural and social foundations, the legacies of violence and the peace-
building initiatives the country concerned has witnessed. The comparative analysis of 
changes in the public security sector, the political system, conflict resolution and the use of 
resources show why there is so much path dependency that can explain the deficits of 
transformation. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Warum ist liberales Peace-building so schwierig? Erfahrungen aus Mittelamerika 
Die Beendigung interner Kriege wird vielfach nicht nur als Möglichkeit für einen Wieder-
aufbau, sondern auch für eine grundlegende Transformation und einen Pfadwechsel zu-
gunsten von Frieden, Stabilität und Entwicklung betrachtet. Die mittelamerikanischen 
Friedensprozesse der vergangenen Dekaden waren ein Versuchslabor für das Paradigma 
des liberalen Peace-building, das in der Annahme gründet, dass der dreifache Transforma-
tionsprozess bestehend aus Befriedung, Demokratisierung und marktwirtschaftlicher Öff-
nung einen sich selbst verstärkenden Prozess zugunsten nachhaltiger Entwicklung in 
Gang setzt. Obwohl keines der drei Länder in den Kriegszustand zurückfiel, weisen die 
Transformationsprozesse in allen drei Nachkriegsgesellschaften grundlegende Defizite 
auf, die weder als Erbe der Kriege noch als „normale“ Entwicklungsprobleme erklärt 
werden können. In dieser Studie wird zunächst ein Analyserahmen entworfen, der die 
dreifache Transformation mit den Einflüssen und Wechselwirkungen zwischen vier Pro-
zessen systematisch in Beziehung setzt: dem internationalen System, den historischen, kul-
turellen und sozialen Grundlagen der betroffenen Gesellschaften, dem Erbe der Gewalt 
und den Initiativen der Friedensentwicklung selbst. Während die internationale Gemein-
schaft grundlegende Reformen verlangte, zeigten die drei Länder unterschiedliche Fähig-
keiten, mit den Herausforderungen der Transformationsprozesse umzugehen. Der Ver-
gleich der Entwicklungen in den Bereichen öffentliche Sicherheit, politisches System, Kon-
fliktbearbeitung und Ressourcennutzung zeigt, warum pfadabhängige Entwicklungen 
vorherrschen und diese die Defizite der Transformation erklären. 
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1. Introduction 
Twenty years ago, on August 7 of 1987, the Central American presidents signed a compre-
hensive peace treaty which was the first important step to end the various internal wars. The 
Esquipulas-II-Treaty laid the foundation for the de-escalation of the wars in Nicaragua, El 
Salvador and Guatemala that had provoked a series of intrastate incidents and made the re-
gion one of the international trouble spots. During the following ten years peace accords 
were signed in Nicaragua (1990), in El Salvador (1992) and in Guatemala (1996).1 War and 
violence took over 300,000 lives, caused the flight of two million Central Americans from 
their homes, and destroyed a significant portion of the already weak social and economic in-
                                                     
1  For the peace processes at the regional and the national levels see Arnson 1999, Child 1992, Dunkerley 1994, 
Isacson 1997, Rouquié 1992 among others. 
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frastructure. The formal end of the wars was seen as a basis not just for recovery but for a 
fundamental transformation of the region towards peace, stability and development. From a 
global perspective, Central America was one of the first laboratories for the liberal peace-
building paradigm which assumes the threefold transformation to peace, democracy and 
market economy is a self-strengthening process leading to sustainable development.2 Al-
though none of the three countries slipped back into war, serious deficits remain that can be 
explained neither as a legacy of war nor as ‘normal’ development problems. 
This paper tries to explain the current problems of the post-war societies as a result of the in-
terdependency and interaction of the threefold transformation processes of democratization, 
economic liberalization and pacification. Post-war transformation does not happen in a vac-
uum but is a result of the influence of four processes that have different dynamics and time 
horizons. These include the impact generated by the international system on a country’s so-
ciety, its historical, cultural and social foundations, the legacies of violence and the peace-
building initiatives the country concerned has witnessed. While the international commu-
nity pressed for substantial reforms, the three Central American post-war societies showed a 
varying capacity to cope with the challenges these changes provoked. Most academic re-
search as well as international cooperation assumes that the termination of war is one of the 
‘critical junctures’ for development processes, opening a window of opportunity for reform 
and change in path-dependent processes. The Central American cases show that even ten 
years after the signing of a peace accord – the time span usually considered necessary to im-
plement peace accords – many challenges remain unaddressed and the danger of slipping 
back into traditional development paths is acute. This paper argues that the problems of the 
Central American transformation are symptoms of systematic failures and deficits of the 
current peace-building approach. It falls short because it is based only on the experiences of 
post World War II in Europe and Japan which is inadequate for two reasons: First, the inter-
national framework has changed dramatically from a state-centered to a globalized system 
resulting in a series of fractures for the post-war societies that can not be overcome by to-
day’s limited peace-building efforts. Second peace-building strategies systematically under-
estimate the influence of local or national development features as well as of the competing 
dynamics favoring violence or peace that characterize post-war societies. 
Taking Central America as an example this paper wants to demonstrate that the complex 
problems of and the differences between post-war societies are a result of the fractures and 
continuities encountered during the threefold transformation process. The structure of the 
paper will be as follows. The second chapter presents a conceptual framework which allows 
for an analysis of the fractures post war societies live with and on their capacities to cope 
                                                     
2  On the concept of liberal peace see Paris 2004. 
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with the problems that have to be solved in the process. Based on this framework, the third 
chapter will then analyze similarities and differences in the main fields of peace-building in 
the three Central American countries. Chapter 4 concludes highlighting lessons learned 
from the Central American cases and suggesting some policy conclusions for strategies of 
peace building in general. 
 
 
2. A Contextual Framework for the Analysis of Post-war Societies 
The liberal paradigm in international politics promotes a threefold transformation process of 
democratization, economic liberalization and pacification as the foundation for peace-
building. The underlying assumption is that the transformation processes will cause a posi-
tive feedback on each other. The theoretical framework is based on the historical experiences 
of Western Europe and the body of sociological, political and economic research developed 
in this context.3 But the reality of most post-war countries is quite different, showing a wide 
range from a direct backslide into war or armed conflict to the development of hybrid re-
gimes that use formal democracy as a façade or renew traditional patterns of ‘mal-
development’ and violence.4 
The main body of the existing literature analyzes these processes from the perspective of ex-
ternal actors (mandate, duration, funding), in specific sectors (elections, aid, reconstruction) 
or in the form of case studies. Comparative and integrated approaches are nearly non-
existent. The following contextual framework aims to contribute to close this gap as it allows 
the comparative analysis of post-war societies from different historical, cultural and regional 
areas. Its starting point is the fact that conflict is inherent to processes of social change and 
development. Both processes lead to fundamental changes of the structures of society and 
provoke realignments of the relations and the power distribution between central actors. In 
the 21st century these processes are influenced by the growing interdependence and the 
various influences the international system and the multitude of actors have all over the 
world. International norms and treaties, global economic trends, etc. have a growing impact 
that cannot be reduced to the actions of peace-building missions or international aid agen-
cies. At the same time the degree and level of their influence is not unidirectional but de-
pends on the historical, cultural and social structure of a given society. From this perspec-
                                                     
3  The theoretical bases of this are the theories of civilization and modernization of Max Weber, Joseph Schum-
peter and Norbert Elias among others. The example of postwar Europe with a focus on nation-building is 
analyzed in Jennings 2003 and Mixin/Kasper 2003. 
4  On the different aspects of problems in post-war societies see Licklider 2001, Doyle/Sambanis 1999, Pugh 
2000, Crocker/Hampson/Aall 2001, Jeong 2002, Steadman/Rothchild/Cousens 2002, Walter 2002, Paris 2004, 
Junne/Verkoren 2005. 
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tive, the main focus of analysis for the developments in post-war societies should be the 
double intersection between the external requirements (supporting or blocking transforma-
tion) and the societal basis (enabling or hindering transformation) and the changes in society 
caused by the war and the process of its termination. 
As a consequence peace-building should be seen as an intermestic issue that has to be ana-
lyzed as the outcome of the complex relations between these four processes (see Figure 1). 
While the interaction between the process of globalization and the historical and cultural 
foundations of a society is most relevant at the level of structures (institutions, models of 
development among others), the intersection between war and peace is highly relevant for 
the behaviour of the central actors (e.g. perceptions, options for action, strategies, alliances). 
The framework thus enables us to integrate the analysis of structures and actors in the proc-
ess of change. 
 
Figure 1: A Contextual Framework for the Analysis of Post-war Societies 
 
Globalization
Norms, values / political and economic environment /  
international and regional context
 
POST-WAR 
SOCIETY 
Societal foundations
History, culture, level of social differentiation and of development 
PEACE 
AND 
PACIFICATION 
WAR 
AND 
VIOLENCE 
Different dynamics and time perspectives
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Compared to other approaches to post-war societies this research perspective has the advan-
dies of path dependency that emphasize the im-
opment in post-war societies are important in this respect and at the 
 war and 
support authori-
                                                     
tage not to limit its analysis on the direct actors and categories of war but rather to start from 
the society as the most important analytical level. This is important as success and failure of 
the transformation processes can only be understood and explained when we look at and 
analyse the interplay between society, war and transformation process. Here the former war 
actors are important but not necessarily the most decisive players. This ‘societal perspective’ 
enables us to analyze long-term processes beyond current conjunctures and events by plac-
ing them in perspective. The analysis therefore follows a double tracked approach looking at 
longitudinal developments and at fractures caused either by war and violence or by the re-
quirements of the transformation process. 
Methodologically the concept relies on stu
portance of time and process.5 In our context the liberal peace hypothesis assumes that war 
termination can be a ‘critical juncture’ for pacification, democratization and development. 
The crucial question is then, whether – and under what conditions – this process is able to 
activate key variables in favour of the self-reinforcing process or remains stagnant, turns 
into hybrid forms or even falls back. So what are the key variables for the threefold trans-
formation process? 
Four fields of devel
same time show the reciprocity and the interplay between the different processes: 
a) The organization, operating mode and legitimacy of the public security sector: During
before its outbreak usually there is no legitimate monopoly of force. In post-war societies the 
establishment of a legitimate (preferably democratically controlled) public security sector is 
thus a central condition or the key variable for pacification and law based regulations of 
conflict. Analysis thus has to include progress and limits of demobilization and reintegra-
tion, spoiler activities, as well as the upsurge of different forms of violence. 
b) The development of the political system: The dynamics of war and violence 
tarian and exclusive tendencies in the political system. Post-war societies thus face the chal-
lenge of liberalization and inclusion of marginalized sectors and the mitigation of polarized 
environments. Transformation theory6 formulates a series of conditions that are important 
for the transition and the consolidation of democracy like a majority of actors favouring de-
mocracy and a lack of viable alternatives. Actually most post-war societies are quite unlikely 
cases for successful democratization. Issues relevant in the post-war context include the 
5  See Pierson 2004 and Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003 among others. 
6  On transformation see Merkel 1999 and Merkel/Puhle 1999; on democratization of post-war countries see 
Kumar 1998, Barnes 2001, Hegre 2004, Call 2007. 
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transformation of armed actors into political actors, their social base, openness for and/or in-
clusion of other political forces. 
c) The establishment of civil forms of conflict regulation has to be based on a process of de-
legitimating the use of violence and force in conflict and the introduction of the rule of law. 
In post-war societies to deal with past violence is a central issue not only for the rehabilita-
tion of the victims and the punishment of the perpetrators but most of all as a method to 
prevent future violence. This includes an analysis of how war and violence are treated in the 
education system as this is a crucial socialisation institution for the next generations. 
d) The use of natural and human resources: The vast discussion about ‘new’ wars and about 
greed as an important incentive for violent actors has made an important contribution to the 
debate on the causes of war and the problems for peace-building.7 But the necessity to trans-
form the main structures of war economies as a basis for peace-building has only recently 
been discussed. Sustainable peace-building needs a social basis that can only be built when 
human and natural resources are – at least in some significant part – used for the general 
welfare and not predominantly for private interest. The generation of taxes by the state and 
the structures of public spending are important indicators here. In post-war societies the 
question of the transformation of war economy structures and the existence of a ‘peace divi-
dend’ are central issues of analysis. While the first can serve as a material basis for spoilers, 
the second should be the social foundation of reform and inclusion. 
These four issues are clearly interdependent as for example the prevalence of war economy 
structures in many cases influences the political system and the public security sector via 
corruption. Deficits in ‘dealing with the past’ allow spoilers and reform adversaries to main-
tain their influence and make civil forms of conflict resolution more difficult. 
Globalization as well as the regional and/or international environment have a mostly am-
biguous impact as they can support the transformation process (e.g. in the field of human 
rights treaties) or restrict it (e.g. through the international criminal economy). The following 
chapter will analyze similarities and differences in the three Central American post-war so-
cieties from this perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7  See Keen 1998, LeBillon 2000, Berdal/Malone 2000, Kaldor 2001, Collier et al. 2003, Pugh/Cooper 2004, Ballen-
tine/Nitschke 2005. 
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3. Continuities and Fractures of Peace-building in Central America 
Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala share a series of common features both at the level of 
the regional and international environment as well as in relation to the historical and cul-
tural basis: The most important influences from the outside during the last decades can be 
summarized under the headings of transnationalization and democratization.8 Both proc-
esses have begun during the wars and were reinforced by the dynamics inherent to war. 
Transnationalization was an economic as well as a demographic phenomenon. During the 
1980s and 1990s the economic elites of the three countries diversified their economic basis 
from the traditional agroexport development model (coffee, bananas, sugar) opening up to 
new agricultural products (e.g. fruit and flowers) as well as to investment into the financial 
sector. Although the traditional oligarchies of the region were somewhat debilitated by war 
and in the case of Nicaragua the Sandinista revolution, this did not weaken them substan-
tially. The differences between the three countries reflect the specific relations of power be-
tween status-quo-oriented and change-oriented actors. Thus the Nicaraguan revolution re-
stricted the influence of the oligarchy and allowed for some mobility of new social forces 
around Sandinista networks while in Guatemala the power of the oligarchy remained nearly 
untouched. This process is also reflected in a growing dynamic of social change and a high 
level of poverty in all three countries (see Table 1). 
The demographic transnationalization in the three countries was a result of war and vio-
lence that led to the displacement and migration of round about two million Central Ameri-
cans inside and out of the region. At the same time the lack of social and economic mobility 
and the high levels of poverty constituted another push factor for mostly illegal migration to 
the United States. The so called remesas or remittances – money migrants send home to sup-
port their families – is nowadays the most important income in foreign exchange for the na-
tional accounts and has surpassed the traditional export earnings. While this is an important 
basis for survival for the most marginalized groups in these Central American countries, it 
also leads to a significant brain drain as the most educated and able people go north thus 
weakening the human resources for sustainable development inside the region. 
Democratization began in the midst of war in all three countries as a result of international – 
mostly US – pressure. Although this led to an opening of the former authoritarian systems 
and to an expansion of options for the non-armed opposition, it also implied a series of re-
strictions: 
 
                                                     
8  See Robinson 2003 for transnationalisation; Paige 1998 and Vilas 1995 for changes in the agrarian sector and 
Córdoba/Maihold/Kurtenbach 2001 for democratization. 
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- Authoritarian enclaves were institutionalized, 
- the military remained in charge of internal ‘security’, and 
- participation remained restricted as long as the wars were ongoing. 
 
Table 1: Indicators of Structural Change and Continuity in Central America 
 Year Nicaragua El Salvador Guatemala 
1975 48.9 41.5 36.7 Urban population 
(in % of total) 2004 58.7 59.5 46.8 
1970 16 16 17 
1980 44 94 63 
1990 169 465 226 
Migration 
(Central Americans living in the United States,  
in thousands) 
2000 245 765 327 
1990 20.4 37.9 25.9 Coffee 
(in % of total exports) 2000 23.3 10.5 18.8 
1980 46.7 52.1 59.3 
1990 41.6 45.9 58.2 
Importance of agrarian sector 
(in % of economic active population) 
2000 37.1 40.3 56.8 
Importance of informal sector 
(in % of economic active population) 
 52.0 
(1998) 
44.3 
(1991) 
53.7 
(1988/89) 
1980 62.0 68.0 63.0 
1990 75 71 75 
Poverty rate 
(share of population living below the poverty line, 
in % of total population)  2001/02 69.4 48.0 60.2 
1980 1.7 3.3 4.6 
1990 2.9 4.9 6.9 
Population living below poverty line 
(in millions) 
2001/02 3.6 3.1 7.0 
Remittances US$ per capita 2002 130 310 140 
Source: Author’s compilation based on HDR 2006; UNODC (2007:43); PNUD (2003:134, 141); PNUD (2003:125); 
Sojo (1999:192); Vilas (1996:469); CEPAL (2005:34); IAD 2004. 
 
Although the different peace treaties all did have regulations on the consolidation and 
deepening of democracy and the civilian control over the armed forces, the three democra-
cies are characterized by structural defects that can be explained as a form of path depend-
ency. While the traditional authoritarian systems were replaced, change was mostly re-
stricted to form and did not include a change of attitudes or substance.9 The consequences of 
the transnationalization were another factor inhibiting the construction of stable reform alli-
ances and a social basis for democratic change. These problems are reflected in the func-
tional fragility of Central American states that are not able to fulfil central functions like the 
establishment of a legitimate monopoly of force or the delivery of basic social services to the 
population. Besides the common features that are mostly influenced by the global and re-
gional dynamics, there are some important differences between the three countries that can 
be explained by the specific historical and cultural foundations as well as the varying dy-
                                                     
9  For the variations between the three countries see the following section 2.2 on the political systems. 
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namics of violence and peace. To analyze this we will look at the four central intersections in 
the following chapters. 
 
 
3.1. Public Security 
In the sector of public security international actors promote demobilization and demilitari-
zation. The key variable for transformation would be the establishment of a democratically 
controlled state monopoly of force while donors mostly focus on reforms that redirect the 
role of the military to the control of borders against external enemies and the establishment 
of civilian police forces to address internal security issues. These challenges met in Central 
America a history and culture where the security forces were the central pillar of a repres-
sive state and where war and violence reinforced the traditional role of the military. The 
varying degrees of success and failure in the Central American countries can be explained 
by the different interactions and features of these processes. 
A central aim of peace accords is an end of violence, the first step in this direction is a cease-
fire followed by the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. In Central 
America this process affected three groups: former guerilla members in El Salvador and 
Guatemala and combatants of the so called contra in Nicaragua, members of the armed 
forces in all three countries that were demobilized due to the substantial reduction of the 
armed forces in the decade following the end of the wars, and the huge number of members 
of the paramilitary forces that the governments had built as a ‘civilian’ support for the 
armed forces. 
 
Table 2: Number of Former Combatants in Central America 
 Nicaragua El Salvador Guatemala 
Insurgent forces* 23,000 11,000 3,000 
Military** 63,500 44,600 44,200 
Paramilitary** 500,000 60-80,000 1,000,000 
* Number of officially demobilized people; ** highest number during war. 
Source: IISS Military Balance (several issues). 
 
The demobilization of the guerilla and contra groups and the reduction of the armed forces 
is seen as the most successful part in the implementation of the Central American peace ac-
cords. Experiences differ from country to country: In the case of Nicaragua it took President 
Violeta Chamorro over 40 accords to satisfy the – overwhelmingly economic – demands of 
rearmed contras and compas (demobilized soldiers of the army). But in the second half of the 
1990s the remains were reduced to a phenomenon of rural banditry acting mostly in the 
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northern regions of the country. In the case of El Salvador the most serious incident was the 
detection of arms the FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional) had kept hidden 
inside Nicaragua. But the UN mission was capable to solve this problem rather fast so that it 
did not lead to a rupture of the whole process. In Guatemala demobilization of the former 
guerilla members was completed by 1998, while only the government of Oscar Berger (2004) 
could implement a substantial reduction of the military.10 
All in all the variations reflect the differences in the structure and power relations of the op-
posing factions and show how the experience of war influences the outcome of transforma-
tion. While the Salvadoran guerilla was a quite homogenous and clearly structured organi-
zation with a common ideology, the contras in Nicaragua were a wild mixture of different 
groups opposing the Sandinista government for very different reasons and were held to-
gether mostly by financial support and pressure from the US. The Guatemalan guerrilla was 
the weakest of the insurgent forces as it lacked a substantial number of combatants as well 
as external support. 
Concerning the reduction of the military, differences are even more pronounced reflecting 
variations in the degree of the military’s historical and war-related autonomy in relation to 
the government. Central Americas’ armed forces traditionally have been the central pillar of 
the state as – side by side with the Catholic Church – they used to be the only national insti-
tution with a presence in most of the territory and controlled the rural areas. Only in the 
case of Nicaragua was the traditional repressive state apparatus destroyed by the Sandinista 
revolution and substituted by a totally new force of former FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Lib-
eración Nacional) combatants. After the FSLN lost the elections in 1990 to the opposition pro-
fessionalization and depolitization were the central mechanisms for the institutional sur-
vival of the armed forces. If they had tried to take sides in the political struggle between the 
Sandinistas and the new government, they most probably would have faced abolishment 
following the examples of Costa Rica and Panama. In El Salvador the war led to a process of 
militarization of the society under a civilian-military coalition but the military stayed de-
pendent on foreign support (mostly US) as well as subordinated to the traditional oligarchy 
which was organized in the right wing ARENA party (Alianza Republicana Nacional). Rather 
different the Guatemalan military not only had sole control of the state until 1985 but even 
after the democratic opening it could retain its independence and autonomy from the oligar-
chy. The first elected president, Vinicio Cerezo, admitted that he had not more than 30 per-
cent of the power – a feature that did not change till the end of the war in 1996. 
                                                     
10  For a discussion on civil-military relations and demobilization see Isacson 1997, Brenes/Casas 1998, for Gua-
temala see Schirmer 1998, 2002 and Keen 2003, for El Salvador see Stanley 1994, for Nicaragua Horton 1998, 
Lincoln/Sereseres 2000. 
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While demobilization was quite successful reintegration of former ex-combatants faced seri-
ous limits. Due to the lack of job opportunities in the formal economy many former combat-
ants joined either delinquent groups or private security companies. In the case of Guatemala 
local analysts talk of about 126,000 men in private security enterprises, 80% of which are 
former members of the military, 15% former policemen. As of February 2007 of the 182 firms 
working in security only 28 are formally legalized.11 The lack of control over a diversity of 
armed actors is one of the central problems of public (in-)security in the region. It is a result 
of both the deficits of the peace-processes and of the lack of opportunities in the formal 
economy. 
Demobilization should have included the paramilitary forces in all three countries too. But 
although they were declared illegal or the decrees establishing them revoked, they were not 
disarmed. In all three countries this deficit is reflected in the extremely high numbers of 
small arms in the hands of the society. A recent UNODC study (2007: 16) cites reputable 
sources from the region which assume that there are about 500,000 fire arms that are legally 
registered and 800,000 that remain unregistered. This is another legacy of the wars contrib-
uting to the high level of violent crime all over the region. But there are some differences 
too: While neither in El Salvador nor in Nicaragua the paramilitary structures of the war 
survived, in the case of Guatemala they not only persist but are still a factor of repression, 
political pressure and in some regions of social control.12 
Due to this context three interrelated issues dominate the public security agenda: organized 
crime (drugs among other illicit activities), delinquency and youth gangs. The high levels of 
poverty and exclusion as well as the everyday experience of violence explain the high levels 
of delinquency and youth gangs. The fact that the dimensions of these problems are lower in 
Nicaragua than in the other two countries is a result of the different character of the Nicara-
guan police which is highly professional, oriented towards prevention and follows a com-
munity oriented approach. 
As to organized crime there are differences too. Only in Guatemala has organized crime 
permeated the structures of the state as well as of the political system. This is a result of two 
processes that are related to the historical fragmentation of Guatemala’s society and to the 
lack of control of the civilian forces over the armed forces and their allies. The reduction of 
the armed forces has not led to their disempowerment as an organized actor – as it has in El 
Salvador and in Nicaragua – but it has just heightened their autonomy and led to the forma-
tion of criminal networks (the so called parallel or obscure powers). Allegations that youth 
gangs are involved in drug traffic can not be substantiated or proven nor are they responsi-
                                                     
11  Personal communication, Guatemala 16.5.2007. 
12  See Peacock/Beltrán 2003, Kurtenbach 2006. 
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ble for the high homicide rates in the region. UNODC (2007: 16f.) cites a study of the Salva-
doran Forensic Institute and a Guatemalan police study that hold youth gangs responsible 
for 8% and 14% of homicides respectively. This contradicts the common discourse of the 
Central American media and politicians. 
Summarizing we can state that the establishment of a legitimate and democratically con-
trolled public security sector as a central condition for pacification was most successful in 
Nicaragua and shows serious deficits in the case of El Salvador and even more so in Guate-
mala. This can be explained due to the impact first the Nicaraguan revolution and second 
the election of the opposition had on the public security apparatus. At the same time exclu-
sion and poverty all over the region are the main structural causes at work responsible for 
the increase of violence and crime. While some – e.g. youth gangs – find a means of survival 
in the street, others work for the – mostly illegal – private security companies. This leads to a 
self-enforcing cycle of repression, criminalization and exclusion. 
 
 
3.2. The Political System 
Democratization of the political system has become the central demand of the various exter-
nal actors for post-war countries. The third wave of democratization and the end of the cold 
war seemed to make democratization possible all over the world. Support from interna-
tional donors centres mostly on elections while the main key variables for transformation 
are legitimacy and a social foundation of democracy. At the same time democratization is a 
very complex and conflictive process because it restructures the traditional power system. In 
the case of Central America the opening of the political systems was meant to enhance the 
participation of formerly marginalized or repressed groups. While the democratization is 
seen as a success of the peace accords, there remain serious restrictions due to a high level of 
path dependency that caused the establishment of rather hybrid regimes that are formally 
democratic but fail to offer an option for real change and inclusion. 
The authoritarian structure and the systems of exclusion were central causes of ‘grievance’ 
in the three countries leading to violent forms of protest as there were no civilian means for 
change.13 The dynamics of war and violence led to a militarization in the three countries and 
supported authoritarian and exclusive tendencies in the political system. The democratic 
opening in the mid 1980s at least gave room for the work of NGOs and other civil society 
                                                     
13  In the case of Honduras the reform oriented policy of the military regime between 1978 and 1982 is mostly 
seen as a major reason for the lack of escalation. However, due to the role Honduras had at the level of the 
regional confrontation where it served as a basis for US support to the contras and to the Salvadoran regime, 
the country does share some of the features of the other post-war societies. 
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organisations mostly under the umbrella of the Catholic Church and in the fields of human 
rights. The first attempts at dialogue and negotiation took place in this environment, but 
could only prosper when there was evidence that military victory was not possible (the 
hurting stalemate) and due to pressure from international and regional actors to end fight-
ing (Contadora-Group, United Nations and Group of Friends). 
Only in Nicaragua was the end of war the result of a lost election of the Sandinista regime, 
while in El Salvador and Guatemala the comprehensive peace accords were the basis for 
general elections with the participation of all political forces. In neither of these cases did the 
insurgents come to power by the way of elections although the Salvadoran FMLN has con-
stantly gained at elections at the local level and is an important parliamentary force. But in 
all three societies the development of the political system up today resembles the structure 
and the relations of power shaped by war, violence and international interventions. 
The political system is the area where the developments of the last decades show the great-
est impact of path dependency. El Salvador has traditionally been the society with the high-
est levels of organization along social lines. Only massive repression by the state and the 
support of the United States did prevent a revolutionary regime change during the 1980s. 
Although it was not successful militarily, the FMLN has been the strongest and best organ-
ized insurgency Latin America saw in the second half of the 20th century. The high level of 
social mobilization in El Salvador is a result of the fact that it is by far the smallest country in 
Central America, where land has been scarce and levels of urbanization high, both leading 
to a mounting pressure for social change that was suppressed by violence first in 1932 and 
later in the 1980s. This ignited to a conflict with a rather simple bipolar structure between 
the armed guerrilla and its civilian supporters on one side and the authoritarian regime and 
the armed forces on the other. 
In Nicaragua the overthrow of the Somoza regime succeeded due to a quite similar constel-
lation, but after the revolution the situation was complicated by the process of internal 
fragmentation leading to varying coalitions and the influence of the US and the second cold 
war. Only when the latter ended was there a possibility for a termination of war. While the 
contras did not have the means to overthrow the Sandinista regime militarily, their existence 
sufficed to delegitimate the revolutionary project on the political level and to make its social 
and economic goals impossible to achieve. At the height of the war the Sandinista regime 
‘invested’ nearly 50% of the state budget into the war effort. The current structure of the 
Nicaraguan political system reflects the structure of war with two blocks of pro- or anti-
Sandinista forces (FSLN versus different Liberal parties) and a small third force which was 
nearly squashed by a silent cooperation in favour of the status quo between the other two. 
Another path dependent element of the Nicaraguan system is its high level of personaliza-
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tion. Even nearly thirty years after the revolution Sandinista politics is dominated by Daniel 
Ortega, while the Liberals are divided between supporters and opponents of Arnoldo 
Alemán (president from 1996 to 2002). 
Politics in Guatemala also reflect the conflict structure as well as path dependent elements of 
political culture. While the reform oriented forces are unable to formulate and agree on a 
joint agenda for change, the Guatemalan oligarchy is nearly unaffected by fragmentation. 
Contrary to the Salvadoran oligarchy it does not have its own political party but finances 
and supports different parties that come up and disappear from election to election. A rather 
new feature of political representation has been the FRG, founded by ex-dictator general 
Efraín Ríos Montt. During the last eight years it was the best organized political force in the 
country based on a personalistic structure and a law-and-order-discourse that belied its own 
inclusion in criminal and corrupt networks. 
At least under the perspective of political stability the transformation of armed actors into 
political parties seems to be an advantage as the differences between El Salvador and Nica-
ragua on one side and Guatemala on the other show. But the main reasons for the continuity 
and path dependency of traditional politics all over the region can be found in two processes 
that seem to reinforce each other. First, where the informal sector dominates, the establish-
ment of a social base necessary for democratic consolidation is restricted. For a significant 
share of the population the main interest is day-to-day economic survival, which makes 
them opt for short time promises and not for strategies that promise change in the medium 
or long run. Second, the high level of everyday violence – that mostly affects poor and mar-
ginalized groups as the better-off can afford private security – leads to a prioritization of 
physical survival over other issues. The discourse of the mainstream media and politicians 
reinforces this by promising politics of ‘hard hand’, ‘super hard hand’ or ‘total security’. 
Youth gangs are a common scapegoat in all three countries. Violence is sensationalized and 
scandalized which allows politicians to avoid addressing the pressing structural problems of 
the marginalized majorities. The criminal networks and the high level of corruption are also 
important factors supporting the status quo of incomplete transformation and peace-
building. 
To sum up we can conclude that while the post-war political systems have been liberalized 
and at least at the formal level the participation of the population is institutionalized, this 
did not lead to a solution of the structural problems that caused the wars. At the same time 
currently there exists no alternative political system or a rivalling vision for society’s future 
serving as a reference point for oppositional social or political actors. While there was a 
transformation of the armed actors into political actors this did not result in the establish-
ment of viable reform alternatives. Thus democratization has helped to address one side of 
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the regions’ grievances but – at least up to the moment – has failed to give a perspective for 
social change and inclusion. 
 
 
3.3. Civil Conflict Regulation 
Democracy rests on civil conflict regulation for which the rule of law is a fundamental basis 
as it sets the rules of the game as well as sanctions deviant behaviour. At the same time the 
functioning of the judiciary and the rule of law are crucial for the establishment of trust in 
civil mechanism in post-war situations. The guarantee of basic human rights as well as the 
promise of dealing with past atrocities rest on a relatively independent judicial system.14 To 
achieve this goal international donors invest heavily in programs of the modernization of 
the judiciary and the rule of law as well as in capacity building for civil conflict regulation. 
While this is necessary the key variable for change in the form of conflict resolution is trust 
in institutions as well as in persons. In most post-war countries the question of dealing with 
past atrocities is a good indicator for change and shows how difficult it is to take action in 
the interplay between requirements coming from the international system, cultural and his-
torical patterns, influence of violent actors and possibilities of peace constituencies. 
At the international level various norms and conventions and institutions like the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) nowadays impede total amnesties for gross human rights viola-
tions of the past. While most of the wars that end with a military victory by one side are fol-
lowed by some forms of jurisdiction, internal wars that end with a peace accord face a much 
more difficult situation. Honouring former gentlemen’s agreement and granting amnesties 
became nearly impossible due to the possibilities given to the victims by international law. 
At the same time the possibilities to bring the perpetrators to justice are heavily influenced 
by their remaining influence or their position as spoilers in the post-accord societies. Other 
legacies of war like the prevalence of violent mechanisms of ‘problem solving’, distrust and 
fear strengthen the influence of violent actors or other spoilers and are hard to overcome. 
But dealing with past human rights abuses is not just important for the rehabilitation of the 
victims and the punishment of the perpetrators. Under a peace-building perspective it 
should be seen as a central mechanism of future violence prevention. The delegitimization 
of violence is a necessary foundation for civil conflict regulation and the empowerment of 
the rule of law. This process should also include the assessment of war and violence in the 
education system as this is a crucial socialisation institution for the next generations. At the 
same time dealing with the possibilities and limits of dealing with the past reflects the real 
                                                     
14  Since the publication of the Brahimi Report in 2000 international peace-building activities have given the rule 
of law increasing priority (see Plunkett 2004). 
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relations of power in post-war societies. Only where violent actors have been marginalized 
or were the international community plays an important role, there is at least a chance to 
bring perpetrators to justice.15 
The three Central American countries show a series of common features in this respect. In 
the case of Nicaragua violence and human rights abuses have been rather low compared to 
the experiences of El Salvador and Guatemala. At the same time there has not been even the 
most rudimentary form of dealing with the past. In El Salvador and Guatemala there have 
been truth commissions that at least documented an important part of the human rights 
abuses but at that point the processes stopped.16 Only in some very prominent cases with a 
lot of international pressure – like the murder of Guatemalan anthropologist Myrna Mack – 
have there been criminal convictions of the direct perpetrators but not of the intellectual au-
thors. The most prominent and representative figures of war and violence like Roberto 
D’Aubuisson in El Salvador and General Efraín Ríos Montt in Guatemala neither have been 
held accountable nor have they been removed as powerful actors in the political system. 
The lack of dealing with past violence is consequently the reason for the existing deficits of 
the rule of law in the three countries. Central America does not have a tradition of law based 
regulations of conflicts, but rather a culture where those who have economic, social or po-
litical power are able to change and twist existing rules for their benefit. Recent develop-
ments in Nicaragua and Guatemala are a case in point. The two pacts between Daniel Or-
tega and Arnoldo Alemán during the last decade served as well for a change from the presi-
dential to a more parliamentarian system as for impunity for charges against Alemán (in re-
lation to corruption) and Ortega (sexual abuse of his step-daughter). In the case of Guate-
mala the rule of law was not bypassed via dialogue but changed through violence. In July 
2003 some 5,000 supporters of Ríos Montt took the streets of Guatemala City and pressed the 
Supreme Court to change the current jurisdiction to allow the General to be candidate in the 
presidential elections.17 
The deficits concerning the rule of law and the lack of delegitimization of violence nourish 
the various forms of criminal and social violence which the state’s security system is not able 
to handle. Under the perspective of peace-building these are the main obstacles for a pro-
gress in transformation of politics as well as in economic development and another reason 
                                                     
15  It is quite interesting that the prosecution of perpetrators is rarely discussed in the growing literature on tran-
sitional justice (for an overview see Darby 2006 and Borer/Darby/McEvoy-Levy 2006). 
16  See Comisión de la Verdad 1993 and Popkin 2002 for El Salvador, CEH 1999 and ODHAG 1998 for Guate-
mala. 
17  During the years before Ríos Montt could not be a candidate because he assumed power by illegal means (a 
coup) in 1982. The constitution of 1985 had a provision that denied those people the right to be president. The 
supporters of Ríos Montt argued that this was illegal retroactive legislation. Although allowed to run in 2003, 
he came in third and could not participate in the second round of the elections. 
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for the upsurge of violence in Central America where the level of post-war violence (e.g. 
homicide rates) is as high as or even higher than during the wars. 
 
 
3.4. Use of Natural and Human Resources 
While awareness of the importance of economic developments and globalization for armed 
conflicts has grown, the debate about the implications of these factors on peace is just begin-
ning. International donors and research centered their interest mostly on curbing the trade 
with licit and illicit products of war economies (diamonds and drugs), the problems of re-
construction of the physical infrastructure and the economic reintegration of the ex-
combatants. Most of the peace accords over the last decade did not address economic con-
cerns directly but treated them ‘with little or vague discussion’ (Woodward 2002:184). While 
this is not enough for peace-building, there are other influences of globalization that have 
had rather negative consequences. 
This is true most of all for pressures coming from the international financial institutions that 
rendered assistance conditional to the implementation of structural adjustment programs 
and the opening of national economies to the world markets.18 This led to a weakening of 
the state’s options to offer employment in the formal sector that was needed for the integra-
tion of ex-combatants, migrants and displaced people. At the same time the privatization of 
state enterprises demanded in these reform packages favored traditional elites and those ac-
tors who gained their fortunes during and via conflict thus perpetuating and enhancing ex-
isting socio-economic disparities and inequalities. Another effect was the establishment of 
new monopolies partly based on criminal or violent networks. For sustainable peace-
building the key variable here is a development model promoting social inclusion and over-
coming at least extreme forms of inequality. 
Developments in Central America are an interesting case in point but have been rarely ana-
lyzed under a perspective of resource use and war economy because they were mostly per-
ceived as results of the cold war. The wars in El Salvador und Nicaragua were externally 
funded although in the case of Nicaragua limitations set by the US-Congress on aid to the 
contras led to the establishment of criminal networks to circumvent this.19 As Guatemala’s 
military regimes did not receive foreign aid due to its gross human rights violations that not 
even the Reagan administration could ignore, the establishment of a war economy served as 
                                                     
18  In post-conflict contexts these politics are even more harmful than in other circumstances – because many 
times they contradict peace-building needs (see Kamphuis 2004). 
19  The illegal supply of the contra with weapons was financed with the trading of drugs (see Scott/Marshall 
1991). 
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a substitute. The control of the country’s borders gave the military the control of different 
forms of smuggling (drugs and humans among others). In none of the countries have these 
structures been dismantled or destroyed after the wars ended. Criminalization is one of the 
fundamental problems all over the region (see UNODC 2007) and the inherent corruption 
and violence undermine all three processes of transformation. 
At war’s end financial transfers from international donors and/or diaspora groups are an-
other factor that influences the access to resources. Although these transfers may help a lot 
of people to survive and improve their day-to-day living, they also relieve the governments 
from their obligation to pursue inclusive policy approaches. This limits positive effects for 
democratic legitimacy out of governance performance and at the same time leads to the es-
tablishment of rent seeking structures and the permanence of the social status quo. 
In Central America social exclusion and inequality have not – or only marginally – de-
creased during the post-war years despite impressive growth rates and macroeconomic sta-
bility.20 The informalization and criminalization of the region’s economies and the related 
violence are symptoms of these underlying processes. At the same time traditional economic 
elites and international enterprises favor the modernization of the exclusionary model of 
development. Most investment in the region goes to so-called ‘megaproyectos’ in mining or 
energy which offer only a few jobs and where the profit is made by a small group of local or 
international entrepreneurs. At the same time these groups only pay minimal royalties and 
taxes. Thus natural resources are not used for the public good but for private enrichment, 
another process that can be interpreted as path dependency. 
 
 
3.5. Lessons Learned 
The comparision of the Central American case studies shows some interesting differences 
and similarities: 
1. Path dependency seems to be strongest in relation to the political system and to the de-
velopment model. Changes have been mostly superficial and due to international pres-
sure (for democratization and elections as well as for market liberalization) and global-
ization. This led to a mere modernization of the traditional status quo where the majority 
of the population is marginalized and excluded, while a few are able to accumulate 
wealth. 
2. The most important difference can be seen in the public security sector, where the con-
sequences of war and in the case of Nicaragua the Sandinista revolution are more pro-
                                                     
20  For development in Central America see PNUD 2003 and Robinson 2003. 
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found. Neither El Salvador nor Guatemala succeeded in a comprehensive security sector 
reform although the international donors invested heavily in police. Corruption and 
criminal networks are the most serious security problems, while youth gangs serve 
mostly as a scapegoat. The comparision with Nicaragua shows that a policy approach of 
prevention and inclusion is able to control and limit youth violence. 
3. The process of dealing with the past seems to have only a small impact on the level of 
post-war violence and is mostly a mirror of the relations of power between the different 
conflict actors. At the same time the lack of delegitimization of violence and the destruc-
tion of social and family networks seems to be one central cause for the upsurge of inter-
familial violence in the region. The high levels of violence in the Central American socie-
ties renew trauma, fear and distrust. The success in the promotion of civil forms of con-
flict resolution will depend on the establishment of transparent and functioning forms of 
rule of law and sanctions against those who do not adhere. This must be the foundation 
for the (re-)construction of trust between people as well as in democratic institutions. 
 
Thus developments in the Central American post-war societies do not provide proof for the 
self-enforcing positive cycle of liberal peace-building, but rather show elements of a negative 
cycle that can be described as follows: 
The lack of social inclusion produces high levels of informality and criminality. This has 
negative consequences for the necessary social foundation as well as for the legitimacy of the 
political systems. In this context spoilers or adversaries to reform are able to use corruption 
and (mostly selective) violence to impede real changes. This limits the capacity of reform-
oriented actors (inside and outside of the state) to establish inclusive forms of development 
and government. 
 
 
4. Conclusion: The Need for Integrated Peace-building Strategies 
As Central America was one of the first laboratories for liberal peace-building, the question 
remains what can be learned at a more general level for analysis of the problems of post-war 
societies as well as for the work of internal and external actors ‘on the ground’. The com-
parative analysis of the Central American cases has shown the added value of the frame-
work presented in Chapter 2 because it allows the identification of differences as well as 
similarities between the developments in different fields beyond oversimplification or ex-
cessive detail use. This leads to some general suggestions for peace-building strategies. 
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First of all, fundamental changes in path dependent developments are only possible if these 
changes have an indigenous base inside society. Otherwise external actors and the interna-
tional community might strengthen internal actors in favor of transformation without being 
able to overcome structural or historical blockades. A strategy of empowerment of and 
alignment with reform oriented actors or ‘drivers of change’ can only be successful in the 
medium or long term. Short term strategies – favored by most external actors looking for 
exit strategies and needing to adjust their resources to global necessities or political priorities 
– are rarely sustainable and endangered by spoiler action. Hence peace-building strategies 
need to be aware of the fact that peace-building is an intermestic issue that can only partly 
be influenced by external actors. 
Second, peace-building strategies are only one set of policies that influence the develop-
ments in post-war countries. The impact of economic or financial globalization usually out-
weighs the possibilities of peace-building programs by far. Thus a ‘whole of government’ 
approach is necessary to promote transformation and stabilization of post-war countries. 
This is difficult as time horizons and dynamics as well as the logic of these policies vary a lot 
and are seldom compatible. 
Third, stabilization and transformation of post-war societies and post-war states are impor-
tant. But unlike some critics of the liberal peace-building paradigm suggest stabilization 
does not need to rely mostly on the repressive capacity of the state (police, military) but 
should be based on inclusion and participation. Otherwise stabilization might either be a 
short interlude or lead to renewed conflict and violence. At the same time, the credibility of 
international conventions and institutions is dependent on the universality of fundamental 
human rights. Opting for a peace-building sequence of ‘stabilization first, democratization 
later’ is not viable in the global context of the 21st century. It would be a relapse to colonial 
paternalism where the ‘developed’ countries of the North decide what post-war countries 
are ripe for democracy. This should not be a serious alternative. Researchers and those 
working in and with peace-building missions should show a lot more creativity in overcom-
ing existent obstacles for peace-building and transformation. 
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